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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS L. WAGSTAFF, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY and DEPARTMENT OF THE ] 
AIR FORCE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
i Case No. 900436-CA 
i Category No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for a writ of review of the Industrial 
Commission Board of Review's decision. Jurisdiction is proper 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(i)(1990) and §78-2a-
3(2)(a)(1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether just cause was shown for Department of the Air Force's 
("Air Force") termination of Wagstaff from his employment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue whether Wagstaff was terminated for "just cause" 
within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act is a mixed 
question of law and fact, involving application of the law to a 
specific fact situation. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d)(1988); 
Pro Benefits, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). A determination whether Wagstaff's conduct 
1 
was culpable is also a mixed question of law and fact. Both issues 
require application by the court of the reasonableness and 
rationality tests. Factual findings cannot be upheld if they are 
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court. Johnson v. Dept. of Employ. 
Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1)(1989) 
Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-102(1990) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this appeal, Wagstaff seeks reversal of a decision by the 
Board of Review finding him disqualified for unemployment 
compensation benefits. Wagstaff applied for benefits following his 
discharge from employment at Hill Air Force Base in January 1990. 
Following an initial denial of benefits by the Department of 
Employment Security, Wagstaff requested a hearing. He appeared at 
a hearing on March 29, 1990, where he was represented by a union 
steward. Wagstaff was found eligible for benefits by 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Norman Barnes, who found that Air 
Force had not established just cause for his discharge. The ALJ 
found that Wagstaff's conduct involving a one time use of an 
alleged controlled substance, approximately six months prior to 
his removal from service, was insufficient to establish the 
culpability element of the just cause test. The Board of Review, 
with one dissent, reversed the ALJ and entered a decision 
disqualifying Wagstaff from receiving benefits. The dissenting 
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board member opined that Wagstaff was not culpable, since his 
conduct was an isolated incident of bad judgment. This appeal from 
the Board's decision followed thereafter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dennis L. Wagstaff began his employment with Hill Air Force 
Base on February 8, 1978 as a sales store checker. (Clerk's 
Notation of Record ("NR"), at 44). In subsequent years, he 
received several promotions, including a promotion to his latest 
position as a pneudraulic systems worker-helper in the Directorate 
of Maintenance Division. (NR 44). At the time of his discharge 
from employment, Wagstaff's supervisor was Lee Stephenson, who 
testified at the hearing. (NR 155). Stephenson testified that 
Wagstaff "worked on a variety of aircraft components" and had a 
"secret clearance." (NR 155). He testified that Wagstaff's 
performance on the job was fully successful or above prior to June 
and July of 1989 and was "probably" the same thereafter. (NR 160). 
His counsel stipulated that there was never "a specific instance 
where Mr. Wagstaff did not adequately perform on the job." (NR 
160) . 
According to a report prepared by the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations (OSI), on July 27, 1989, "a source of 
unknown reliability," related that Wagstaff and other employees 
were using cocaine at HAFB. (NR 38). See Addendum. The OSI 
report went on to detail further investigation of the allegation, 
including an interview with Wagstaff on November 1, 1989. (NR43). 
One of the interviewers was Dennis Behm, a special agent who 
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testified at Wagstaff's unemployment hearing. (NR 43, 143). 
According to the report, "SUBJECT said he used cocaine with ACOSTA, 
SHELDON, and VALDEZ during Jun-Jul 89 at a park in Clearfield, UT, 
during their lunch break." (NR 43). At his hearing, Wagstaff 
testified to reluctantly inhaling an undetermined amount of a 
substance which Acosta and Sheldon said was cocaine. (NR 187-88, 
191-92). Wagstaff denied ever having used cocaine on other 
occasions and voluntarily submitted to a urinalysis. (NR 43). The 
results of the urinalysis test received on December 6, 1989 "did 
not identify the presence of any controlled substances." (NR 44). 
Wagstaff was never charged with committing a crime. (NR 199-200). 
The OSI report includes summaries of statements by other HAFB 
workers regarding Wagstaff's alleged drug use. Specifically, a co-
worker named Acosta allegedly admitted using cocaine with Wagstaff 
but "could not recall the location or the date." (NR 38). The 
other co-worker, Sheldon, allegedly "revealed he had seen SUBJECT 
use cocaine in Bay 5, Building 1917, HAFB, Utah." (NR 38). A 
third co-worker, Robert Swider, allegedly related that Wagstaff 
"has used and possessed cocaine while at work..." (NR 38). Swider 
also allegedly reported that Wagstaff had smoked marijuana while 
on a river trip during Memorial Day weekend 1989. (NR 42). The 
OSI report includes a summary of an interview with Vicki Hobbs, 
who "mentioned he smoked marijuana with Acosta, Valdez and 
Sheldon..." (NR 43). At his hearing, Wagstaff denied that he had 
ever used cocaine, with the exception of the one incident in June 
or July of 1989. (NR 181). Wagstaff also denied having used 
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marijuana on the Memorial Day weekend river trip. (NR 186). None 
of the persons identified in the report who made allegations of 
further drug use were called as witnesses by the employer. Their 
statements, as recounted by Dennis Behm and as recorded in the OSI 
report, were admitted as hearsay. (NR 142). 
Included in the OSI report is a summary of an interview with 
Lee Stephenson. The report summarizes: 
STEPHENSON claimed SUBJECT told his supervisor 
he was nervous because SHELDON was arrested on 
27 Oct 89 for cocaine use. SUBJECT feared 
SHELDON would implicate him and he would 
subsequently be arrested. SUBJECT told his 
supervisor he was willing to talk to OSI in 
order to straighten out any questions they 
would have. 
SUBJECT further told his supervisor that if he 
was administered a urinalysis, he would fail 
because he has used drugs. (NR 39). 
At his hearing, Wagstaff denied ever having said to Stephenson that 
he was "nervous", feared implication or arrest, or if administered 
a urinalysis, would likely fail it. (NR 182-83). Under cross-
examination, Stephenson admitted that the statement in the report 
that Wagstaff "told his supervisor that if he was administered a 
urinalysis, he would fail because he has used drugs..." was 
incorrect. (NR 195). He described the incorrect statement as a 
"typographical error." (NR 195). 
On January 12, 1990, Wagstaff was served by Air Force with a 
Notice of Proposed Removal. (NR 9). The notice states that the 
action was being proposed "for the offenses of using illegal drugs 
on and off government premises during work hours, and disregard of 
directives." (NR 9). The notice is based on the OSI investigative 
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report and specifically refers to the reports of alleged drug use 
by co-workers Acosta and Sheldon. The only other basis for the 
proposed action was Wagstaff's admission of alleged drug use on one 
occasion during June or July 1989 while on a lunch break. (NR 9). 
On January 29, 1990, Wagstaff was served with a Decision to Remove 
signed by Richard Naylor advising him of removal on January 30, 
1990. (NR 6). Also served on Wagstaff was a debarment from Hill 
Air Force Base signed by Colonel William Bahter, ordering him "to 
leave Hill Air Force Base immediately and never to reenter." (NR 
8). Wagstaff's last day of work at HAFB was January 29, 1990. (NR 
2). He then applied for unemployment compensation benefits on 
January 31, 1990. (NR 1). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Board's decision should be reversed, since the employer 
failed to meet its burden of establishing just cause for its 
discharge of Wagstaff. No showing of actual or potential harm was 
made, and the Air Force stipulated that Wagstaff was terminated 
because of its zero tolerance of drugs policy, which is not the 
correct standard for unemployment compensation benefits. Air Force 
did not establish substantial evidence that trust and loyalty in 
Wagstaff had been affected by a remote, one-time incident involving 
experimentation with a substance said to be cocaine. 
The Board further erred by relying on hearsay in refusing to 
apply the isolated incident exception. The record shows that the 
hearsay statements against Wagstaff were contradicted by other 
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evidence, by testimony of Air Force's own witnesses and by the 
circumstances under which they were made. 
There is substantial evidence that Air Force abruptly changed 
its policies in September 1989, after the alleged drug incident, 
to mandate removal for a first time drug offense rather than 
rehabilitation as was the previous recorded policy. Wagstaff had 
no notice of this change and, therefore, lacked the knowledge 
necessary to satisfy the just cause test. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN FINDING THAT WAGSTAFF 
WAS DISCHARGED BY HIS EMPLOYER FOR JUST CAUSE, SINCE 
HIS CONDUCT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CULPABLE TO BE 
DISQUALIFYING UNDER §35-4-5(b) (1) OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT. 
On the basis of the record established in this case, the Board 
of Review found that Air Force had discharged Wagstaff from his 
employment for reasons that are disqualifying under Utah Code Ann. 
§35-4-5(b)(1) of the Employment Security Act. The Act provides, 
in part: 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
.... 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant was 
discharged for just cause... Utah Code Ann. 
§35-4-5(b)(l)(1989). 
In regulations adopted by the Industrial Commission, the basic 
factors establishing just cause are set out. They include 
culpability, knowledge and control. The ALJ and the Board of 
Review found that knowledge and control had been established. 
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However, at the time of the incident on which Air Force bases the 
disqualification, Wagstaff did not have knowledge of a change in 
policy regarding the appropriate penalty for a first time offense 
of drug use. See Argument infra. at 19. Since culpability is a 
key element in the Board's decision, the regulations regarding this 
factor are set out below in extenso; 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the 
severity of the offense as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. 
The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered "necessary" if it is 
not consistent with reasonable employment 
practices. The wrongness of the conduct must 
be considered in the context of the particular 
employment and how it affects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there is no 
expectation that the conduct will be continued 
or repeated, potential harm may not be shown 
and therefore it is not necessary to discharge 
the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are 
important in determining if the act or 
omission is an isolated incident or a good 
faith error in judgment. An employee who has 
historically complied with work rules does not 
demonstrate by a single violation, even though 
harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid 
future harm to the employer. For example: A 
long term employee who does not have a history 
of tardiness or absenteeism is absent without 
leave for a number of days due to a death in 
his immediate family. Although this is a 
violation of the employer's rules and may 
establish just cause for discharging a new 
employee, the fact that the employee has 
established over a long period of time that he 
complies with attendance rules shows that the 
circumstance is more of an isolated incident 
rather than a violation of the rules that is 
or could be expected to be habitual. In this 
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case because the potential for harm to the 
employer is not shown, it is not necessary for 
the employer to discharge the employee, and 
therefore just cause is not established. Utah 
Admin. R.475-5b-102 (1990). 
Air Force, as initiator of Wagstaff's separation, bears the burden 
of proving that Wagstaff's conduct rose to the degree of 
culpability to provide a basis for denying unemployment benefits. 
Utah Admin. R.475-5b-103 (1990); Department of Air Force v. 
Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
The ALJ who heard Wagstaff's case correctly found that Air 
Force had not established culpability. He relied, in part, on 
Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 744 P. 2d 330 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), wherein evidence was adduced that a claimant 
had smoked marijuana twice a week up until his termination from 
employment. The court in Champlin noted that the critical question 
in a "just cause" termination is what that "cause" was. Id., at 
332. In approving an allowance of unemployment compensation 
benefits, the court noted that there was no evidence that the 
claimant's work performance was anything but acceptable, despite 
his admitted drug use. It noted testimony by the claimant's 
supervisor who "testified unequivocally that Robinson was a 
satisfactory employee who had no difficulty in maintaining and 
performing his job." Id. , at 332. There was no evidence in 
Champlin that the employee had reported to work under the influence 
of marijuana or had used it while on the job. 
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Like the employee in Champlin, Wagstaff's supervisor, Lee 
Stephenson, acknowledged under oath that there was no evidence that 
his employment performance had ever been less than satisfactory. 
Despite a long period of surveillance, including the use of video 
cameras, no evidence was produced that Wagstaff, in contrast to 
other suspected employees, had ever used a controlled substance 
while on duty. The Board's conclusion that Wagstaff's consumption, 
while on a lunch break, of a substance said to be cocaine made it 
"inevitable" he was under the effect of drugs when he returned to 
work is pure speculation without any basis in fact. The only 
evidence offered by Air Force to establish the effect of alleged 
cocaine use came in the form of testimony by Dennis Behm, a special 
agent for OSI. Behm testified to having attended a "13-week basic 
investigator's course" in 1983 and to having had "recurring 
training since then, some of which centered around drugs..." (NR 
144). He testified concerning the effects of cocaine: 
The initial high lasts, oh, anywhere from 20 
minutes to an hour to an hour and a half but 
the residual effects remain for several hours. 
(NR 145). 
On cross-examination, Behm acknowledged that he was not an expert 
witness and that his opinion regarding the effect of cocaine use 
was derived "from articles that I've read." (NR 146). The Board's 
conclusion that it was "inevitable...that the claimant returned to 
base under the influence of the cocaine..." (NR 224) is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
No evidence was introduced by Air Force to show any actual 
harm from Wagstaff's alleged drug use. His supervisor testified 
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that all of his work was checked and no defects ever found. (NR 
201). He received no "write ups" following the incident or any 
suggestion that his work was unacceptable. As the ALJ correctly 
noted, "the claimant was not terminated as a result of his job 
performance, his work performance had nothing to do with, with the 
discharge issue..." (NR 202). 
Not only was there no actual harm shown to the employer's 
rightful interests, a reasonable person may properly conclude that 
Air Force did not consider Wagstaff's remote one time use of an 
alleged controlled substance a potential harm to its operation. 
Supervisor Stephenson testified that even prior to October 27, 1989 
he had knowledge that Wagstaff was allegedly involved in cocaine 
usage. Despite that claimed knowledge and despite Wagstaff's 
admission on November 1, 1989, nothing was done to remove him from 
his position as an aircraft mechanic. As can be inferred from the 
ALJ's questioning of the employer at the hearing (NR 173) it defies 
credibility for Air Force to maintain that it was seriously 
concerned about drug impairment when it continued Wagstaff's 
security clearance until January 29, 1990 and allowed him to work 
on "multi-million dollar aircraft" right up to the day of his 
departure. 
The Board's reference to the Industrial Commission's proximal 
cause rule suggests that it too was uncomfortable with the 
remoteness of the claimed cause for discharge. The rule provides 
that when a discharge does not occur immediately after the employer 
learns of an offense, "a presumption arises that there were other 
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reasons for the discharge." Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-106 2 (1990). 
The Board disposes of the presumption by concluding that Air 
Force's investigation required a great deal of time and that it 
could not do anything in regard to Wagstaff's employment activity 
until the process had run its course. Such is not the case, since 
Air Force's own rules permit immediate removal of an employee when 
it considers its interests at risk. (NR 79). The Board is wrong 
in concluding that the presumption was overcome. The real reason 
for Wagstaff's removal from his position was not a concern that his 
reluctant experimentation with an alleged controlled substance had 
caused or would cause harm, but rather was the result of blind 
adherence to a zero tolerance drug policy which is not the standard 
for determining eligibility under the Employment Security Act and 
its regulations. 
Statements by Air Force's representatives at Wagstaff's 
hearing further support the conclusion that actual or potential 
harm from drug use was not the real motivation for discharging 
Wagstaff. In his testimony, Lee Stephenson acknowledged that one 
of the critical statements in the OSI report attributed to him was 
incorrect. Despite his knowledge of this error, he testified that 
he relied exclusively on the OSI report in recommending removal. 
He did not bother to verify any of the hearsay statements regarding 
alleged drug use on base. In response to the ALJ's question as to 
what it was about the alleged drug use incident that made 
Stephenson decide to take removal action, the supervisor responded: 
STEPHENSON It is, the policy to me is very clear. 
It comes from the president all the way through 
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the AFLC commanders. They tell me that zero 
tolerances to drugs, zero. What does zero... 
(NR 161). 
Further evidence of Air Force's true reasons for discharging 
Wagstaff can be found in an exchange between Air Force's counsel 
and Wagstaff's representative at the hearing. Following Air 
Force's stipulation that Wagstaff had always performed his job 
adequately, the following exchange occurred: 
CELLI Well, then, I'm at a loss as to why you're 
removing him to promote the efficiency of the 
service if the service isn't suffering. Can you 
explain that? 
JONES You're ta-, we're not talking about his on the job 
work on an aircraft, I'm talking about loss of 
confidence, trust, and his ability to maintain 
a security clearance. (NR 160). 
The difficulty with the Air Force's position is that it ignores the 
Industrial Commission regulations requiring a showing of actual or 
potential harm to the employer.1 A similar approach by Air Force 
in Dept. of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, supra, and Dept. 
of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security. 786 P.2d 1366 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), was rejected. The court noted that the Industrial 
Commission rules identify the legitimate interests of the employer 
as including, but not limited to: "good will of customers, 
reputation of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty." Utah Admin. 
*Air Force's position also ignores its own policy contained in 
AFR 40-790, Paragraph 32 which provides that "it must be clearly 
determined whether the abuse has or may have a direct adverse 
affect [sic] on job performance or some identifiable detriment to 
the efficiency of the Air Force." (NR 83). 
13 
R. 475-5b-107 (1990). As in the previous case, Air Force has 
failed to show how Wagstaff's one indiscretion exposed it to public 
notoriety or dishonor, since it appears from the record that only 
a few persons ever knew of the incident involving alleged drug use. 
Air Force presented no evidence that employee morale or discipline 
was affected, nor did it demonstrate how its trust and confidence 
were diminished. The closest Air Force Ccime to presenting evidence 
on this point is in the testimony of Vincent Naylor, HAFB Section 
Chief. (NR 164). In one of a series of leading questions, Naylor 
was asked by his counsel "did you express a loss of trust and 
confidence in Mr. Wagstaff..." (NR 166). Naylor's affirmative 
response is self-serving testimony and entitled to little weight. 
As it did in earlier cases, "Air Force simply argued at the hearing 
that [employee's] conduct violated Air Force standards of conduct 
and consequently he should be removed from employment." Dept. of 
Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 786 P.2d at 1363. 
The court has also addressed whether loss of a security 
clearance is equivalent to a loss of license and thereby 
disqualifying under Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-108 5 (1990). The court 
concluded in Dept. of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, supra. 
at 1366, that if the claimant's conduct was not culpable, loss of 
a security clearance is not disqualifying. 
The Board also failed to properly apply its own regulations 
which direct it to consider the offensive conduct within the 
context of the particular employment and in light of the employee's 
longevity and prior work record. Specifically, conduct which a 
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reasonable person would consider "an isolated incident of poor 
judgment" negates a showing of potential harm and obviates the need 
for a discharge. One of the three members of the panel found that 
this exception applied in Wagstaff's case. She opined: 
In my opinion, the claimant clearly used poor 
judgment in "going along with the boys" in 
using cocaine on one occasion during a lunch 
break in June or July of 1989. Such conduct 
is a matter of serious concern to the employer 
which may justify substantial disciplinary 
action. However, in my opinion, the employer 
overreacted in discharging the claimant for 
this single incident of poor judgment. The 
claimant's entire career should not be 
destroyed as a result of such a single 
incident. (NR 239). 
There is substantial evidence for finding that the "isolated 
incident" exception applies in this case. Wagstaff had been 
employed at Hill Air Force Base for 12 years at the time of his 
removal, during which time he had never been the subject of any 
disciplinary action. His work was considered entirely satisfactory 
and he had received regular promotions. As the dissenting Board 
member notes, Wagstaff voluntarily participated in a urinalysis 
which produced a negative result. Had he been a habitual drug 
abuser, it seems unlikely that he would have agreed to such a test 
and that the results would be negative. No evidence was presented 
by Air Force to support a conclusion it was likely the conduct 
would continue. 
In reversing the ALJ's decision, the Board adopted Air Force's 
position that actual or potential harm need not be shown in order 
to deny unemployment compensation benefits. Citing the "sensitive 
nature of the employer's mission" and "claimant's responsibility 
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to work on multi-million dollar aircraft", the Board concluded that 
it "cannot find the employer's stated policy of zero tolerance for 
drug abuse to be unreasonable." (NR 238). By adopting such a 
policy, the Board acted contrary to the statute, its own 
regulations and decided case law on the subject. This court should 
not approve such a departure from established law. 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN BASING ITS 
DECISION ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE-
Once the remote incident of alleged drug use is removed from 
this case, all that remains is hearsay evidence. Although hearsay 
is admissable in an administrative proceeding, findings must be 
based on a residuum of legal evidence admissable in a court of law. 
Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm. , 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 
1984). The Board acknowledges its reliance on hearsay evidence 
when it states: 
The majority of the Board of Review is not 
entirely persuaded that the incident of drug 
usage which the claimant admits was the 
isolated incident he claims it to be. (NR 
238). 
A careful consideration of the record should have convinced 
the Board that the hearsay in this case was entitled to no weight. 
The allegations of further drug use by Wagstaff were made by 
persons under close investigation for commission of crimes and who 
were later arrested. Knowing that they faced criminal prosecution, 
it would not be unusual for such suspects to attempt to improve 
their bargaining position by cooperating with the investigation and 
naming as many suspects as possible. The two co-workers (Acosta 
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and Sheldon), listed in Air Force's Notice of Proposed Removal as 
having seen other drug use, were the two individuals who supplied 
the alleged cocaine in June or July 1989• Given the long period 
of time that had elapsed since the one incident involving Wagstaff, 
it is also quite likely that recollections of time, persons and 
events would have blurred. Significantly, none of the accusers was 
apparently ever confronted regarding the allegations nor produced 
as a witness at the unemployment hearing. 
The OSI report itself is not a model of criminal 
investigation. One of the critical allegations against Wagstaff, 
that he expressed to his supervisor a fear of taking a urinalysis 
test, was admitted by the interviewee to be incorrect. Only one 
of the agents involved in the investigation appeared at the hearing 
to testify concerning its content. One of the two hearsay 
statements upon which the removal was based was recorded by agents 
Charles Huyck and Joe Aguirre who never appeared at the hearing to 
testify. One of the hearsay statements by witness Hobbs that 
Wagstaff had "smoked marijuana" on the weekend of October 28, 1989 
was directly contradicted by the results of a urinalysis taken a 
few days later on November 1, 1989. In sum, there is considerable 
reason for not according any weight to the hearsay statements upon 
which the Board admittedly relied in denying Wagstaff benefits. 
Despite its stipulation that Wagstaff 's discharge was prompted 
by its zero tolerance of drug use, Air Force too sought to use 
hearsay to discredit him. Implicit in the Board's statement that 
Wagstaff's experimentation with an alleged controlled substance was 
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not an isolated incident is a finding of credibility• Wagstaff 
testified that he had never used drugs prior to the one occasion. 
Air Force sought through cross-examination of Wagstaff to discredit 
his statement on this point. For example, in response to an 
objection to questions regarding Wagstaff's river trip, Air Force 
counsel explained: 
JONES Well, we're talking about credibility. He said 
he's only used drugs once and that was the 
cocaine use. And now there's, there's also 
evidence that he was involved at least in the 
use of marijuana. (NR 185). 
At an administrative hearing, the ALJ is in the best position 
to judge the credibility of a witness. It is evident from the 
ALJ's decision that he considered Wagstaff credible. The court 
should give great deference to the ALJ's finding, and not that of 
the Board of Review, since he was in the best position to judge 
credibility. Indeed, there is support for applying a heightened 
scrutiny test when a review board reverses an ALJ's finding on 
credibility. See Fierro v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 
1986) (When the Secretary of Health and Human Services acting 
through his appeals council overturns an ALJ decision and differs 
with the ALJ's assessment of witness credibility, a reviewing court 
should apply heightened scrutiny in its review.) If Wagstaff's 
testimony is accepted as credible, then the dissenting member of 
the Board is correct that the alleged drug use was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment. 
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POINT III 
JUST CAUSE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED FOR THE 
DISCHARGE BECAUSE WAGSTAFF DID NOT HAVE 
KNOWLEDGE OF A CHANGE IN POLICY THAT 
MANDATED REMOVAL RATHER THAN REHABILITATION. 
There is substantial evidence in the record that Wagstaff 
could not have known of Air Force's policy on the penalty for a 
first offense of drug use, despite his testimony at the hearing. 
In an effort to establish the knowledge element of the just cause 
test, Air Force introduced into the record a number of policies 
relating to drug use. See Addendum. The policies do more than 
establish that Wagstaff had notice of a potential penalty for drug 
use. They show also that prior to September 1989, Air Force policy 
was to encourage rehabilitation rather than initiate immediate 
removal of a drug offender. A document entitled "60 Day General 
Notice-Air Force Civilian Drug Testing Program" issued on May 11, 
1989 (NR 15) provides, in pertinent part: 
We encourage any employee who has a substance 
abuse problem to seek appropriate counseling 
and rehabilitation assistance. Employees who 
voluntarily identify themselves as having an 
illegal drug problem within the time frames 
established by the program, seek counseling, 
or rehabilitation, agree to a last chance 
agreement and refrain from using illegal drugs 
will not be subject to disciplinary action. 
(NR 16). 
Assuming that Wagstaff's voluntary admission of drug use and his 
taking of a urinalysis qualifies him as "an employee who has a 
substance abuse problem", Air Force should have provided 
rehabilitation, not the initiation of immediate removal. 
Attachment 3 to AFR 40-750, dated July 23, 1982, reflects Air Force 
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policy and recommends for a first offense of using a dangerous 
drug: "Reprimand to 5 Day Suspension." (NR 77). Attachment 5 to 
that policy statement under the heading "Drug or Alcohol Abuse" 
directs that the contemplated disciplinary action be postponed for 
a reasonable time to allow an employee identified as having a drug 
abuse problem to enroll in an approved rehabilitative program. (NR 
79). AFR 40-750 §16b(2) provides that: 
Normally, a progression of disciplinary 
measures is taken in an effort to rehabilitate 
an employee before management decides to 
remove the individual. (NR 74). 
Subsection lid of Attachment 3 directs that "[t]he penalty selected 
should consider the offender status as an experimenter, user or 
addict and should, whenever possible, contribute to his or her 
rehabilitation and recovery." (NR 77). 
It is clear from Air Force's own introduced policies that 
rehabilitation and a progression of disciplinary measures was once 
the norm. That standard changed abruptly following President 
Bush's declaration of a war on drugs in his televised September 
1989 speech. On September 18, 1989, in response to the 
President's speech, U.S.A.F. Commander Alfred G. Hansen issued a 
memorandum urging all Air Force logistics commands to increase 
their efforts to eliminate drug abuse. (NR 48). In response to 
General Hansen's memorandum, Lt. Gen. McCoy at Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base issued a memorandum, dated September 29, 1989, to all 
AFLC Commanders interpreting General Hansen's policy statement as 
a "zero tolerance for drugs and employees who abuse drugs..." (NR 
47). He further stated, in part: 
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[I]t may be appropriate to initiate removal 
action against a first time drug offender, 
even though AFR 40-750 currently suggests no 
more than a five day suspension. (NR 47). 
In response to Lt. Gen. McCoy's memorandum, Maj. Gen. James 
W. Hoff, Commander at HAFBf issued a memorandum on November 20, 
1989 strongly endorsing the new policy and stating, among other 
things: 
I expect increased efforts on the part of all 
concerned to ensure that all available 
measures are taken to wage this war on drugs, 
to include criminal prosecution and the most 
severe administrative discipline which in most 
cases will lead to removal from Air Force 
employment. (NR 46). 
It is clear from the above that a new and more severe policy 
in regard to drug use was instituted in September 1989. Since the 
incident for which he was discharged took place in June or July, 
1989, Wagstaff had no notice that the Air Force policy in regard 
to drug use had changed. Therefore, the knowledge element of the 
just cause test was not met. The evidence shows a dramatic shift 
by Air Force in the way in which it approached drug abuse, 
following the September speech by President Bush. Had the isolated 
incident in Wagstaff's career come to light prior to September 
1989, it is likely that he would have received the same 
rehabilitative approach as is recommended in Air Force policies. 
There is, in fact, evidence in the record that earlier, 
equally serious offenses, such as being drunk on duty and attempted 
possession of illegal drugs, resulted in suspension, not removal. 
Industrial Commission regulations direct that an employer's failure 
to uniformly apply reasonable standards to all employees when 
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instituting disciplinary action negatives a finding of just cause 
for discharge. Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-101 (1990). The Air Force's 
failure to accord Wagstaff the same treatment as others 
demonstrates the arbitrary and capricious nature of its actions and 
provides further support for reversal of the Board of Review's 
decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny 
eligibility for unemployment compensation. Champlin Petroleum v. 
Dept. of Empl. Security, 744 P.2d at 333. It is doubtful in this 
case that Air Force had a sufficient factual basis to discharge 
Wagstaff, given its own policies; it is certain the Board of Review 
did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact to deny him 
unemployment compensation benefits. The court should reverse the 
Board and order reinstatement of the ALJ's decision. 
Respectfully submitted this ,:>o»' day of October, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Petitioner 
MICHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney at Law 
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SYNOPSIS 
1-1. ^On 27 Jul 89, 0C-1T, a source of unknown reliability, related that 
SUBJECT and other Directorate of Maintenance employees, specifically, NEVIN 
SHELDON, JAMES VALDEZ, and LEWJS SAVAGE were using cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg 
1917, HAFB, UT.' On 27 Oct 89, ACOSTA admitted to using cocaine with SUBJECT; 
however, he could not, recall the location or the date. /SHELDON revealed he 
had seen SUBJECT use cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg 1917, HAFB, *OT.'^yOn 30 Oct 89,^  
SUBJECT advised his supervisor he was concerned about the arrests made on 27 
Oct 89. wC)n 1 MovtK89,. SUBJECT admitted using cocaine with JAMES^ACOSTA,^ 
Directorate of Maintenance enployee, SHELDON, VALDEZ, and SAVAGE." SUBJECT 
subsequently consented to an examination of his urine which was submitted to 
the Air Force Drug and Testing Laboratory, Brooks AFB, TX. SUBJECT'S 
girlfriend revealed he had told her he had used cocaine in the past; however, 
he has since wanted to straighten out his life and not be involved in the use 
of drugs. 'ROBERT SWIDER, SUBJECT'S coworker, related SUBJECT has used and 
possessed cocaine while at work, specifically Bay 5, Bldg 1917T SUBJECT'S 
urine sample did not reveal the presence of any controlled substances. 
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BACKGROUND 
^2-1. This investigation was based on information received from OC-1 that 
SUBJECT and coworkers were using cocaine in Bay 5, Building 1917. 
NARRATIVE 
Confidential Source Information 
J 3-1. On 27 Jul 89/ OC-1, a source of unknown reliability, related SUBJECT 
was using cocaine with NEVIN SHELDON, Subject of AFOSI case number 
8914D17-3996, JAMES VALDEZ, Subject of AFOSI case number 8914D17-3997, and 
LEWIS SAVAGE, Subject of AFOSI case number 8914D17-4000. The cocaine was 
being used in Bay 5, Building 1917, Hill AFB (HAFB) , UT. It was unknown to 
OC-1 if SUBJECT was providing* the cocaine. 
Witness Interviews 
3-2. INTERVIEW OF: LEE STEPHENSEN, SUBJECT'S Supervisor 
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Telephonic 
INTERVIEWER: SA JOE M. AGUIRRE 
STEPHENSEN claimed SUBJECT told his supervisor he was nervous because SHELDON 
was arrested on 27 Oct 89 for cocaine use. SUBJECT feared SHELDON would 
implicate him and he would subsequently be arrested. SUBJECT told his 
supervisor he was willing to talk to OSI in order to straighten out any 
questions they would have. 
SUBJECT further told his supervisor that if he was administered a urinalysis, 
he would fail because he has used drugs. 
y
 3-3. INTERVIEW OF: GREGORY ACOSTA 
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Bldg 1917, HAFB, UT 
INTERVIEWERS: SA CHARLES HUYCK, DEA 
SA AGUIRRE 
After rights advisement, ACOSTA initially denied having used or possessed 
cocaine or any other controlled substances while working on HAFB, UT. 
Subsequently, ACOSTA admitted to using cocaine approximately four months prior 
while at a party; however, it was with persons other than DoD civilian 
employees. ACOSTA declined to provide names of people who he used cocaine 
with or the name of the individual that provided the cocaine. 
After ACOSTA was shown a segment of a video, he bowed his head and said, 
"Shit, I'm fucked." ACOSTA admitted he provided the cocaine which which was 
used by SHELDON, VALDEZ, and himself on 18 Oct 89. ACOSTA further admitted to 
providing and using cocaine with SHELDON and VALDEZ while at work in the past. 
When asked what he used to crush the cocaine with on 18 Oct 89, he said he 
used a fingernail clipper, which was in his pocket. Approximately one month 
ago, VALDEZ and he used cocaine in VALDEZ's van while at work. ACOSTA 
provided the cocaine on this occasion also. w ACOSTA also used cocaine with 
SAVAGE and SUBJECT during work hours; however, they were not on HAFB, UT. He 
could not recall the dates, where they used at, or how long ago it was. 
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ACOSTA claimed during Aug/Sep 89, SHELDON told him he and SAVAGE used cocaine 
while at his (SHELDON'S) ^ residence in Layton, UT. ACOSTA denied having 
knowledge were SHELDON or SUBJECT got the cocaine. ACOSTA further denied ever, 
charging or selling cocainfe to SHELDON or VALDEZ. He always offered to share 
cocaine he purchased. 
ACOSTA purchased two one-quarter gram bindles of cocaine from GILBERT MADRIL, 
Salt Lake City {SIC), UT the day before (17 Oct 89). This was the cocaine 
they used on 18 Oct 89 while at work. G. MADRIL was described as an hispanic 
male, 40-42 years.,, old, 5,7,t~5,9,l/ 150-160 lbs, black hair, brown eyesf 
moustache, semi-bald, and occasionally grew a goatee. JERRY MADRIL, G. 
MADRIL*s brother and manager of a hotel located next door to Dusty1 s Van and 
Car lot, SLC, UT, also sells cocaine. ACOSTA denied purchasing cocaine from 
him. ACOSTA usually purchased 1/4 to 1/2 grams; of cocaine at a time for 
$40.00. ACOSTA has seen G. MADRIL possess a couple of eight balls (1/8 ounce) 
of cocaine in the past. He began purchasing cocaine from G. MADRIL 
approximately nine months ago. ACOSTA usually visited G. MADRIL around 
1700-1800 hrs in the evenings when he was interested in purchasing cocaine. 
It was unknown to ACOSTA if J. or G. MADRIL ever sold cocaine to any other DoD 
civilian employees or USAF members. Since ACOSTA has known G. MADRIL, he has 
not known of him having outside employment. ACOSTA denied knowing- I^DRIL's 
supplier, however, he knew J. and G. MADRIL sold to other individuals (NFI)« 
It was unknown to ACOSTA if MADRILfs other customers were DoD civilian 
employees or USAF members. 
ACOSTA denied having knowledge of any other employees at his work section, DoD 
civilian employees, or any USAF members that were involved in any use, 
possession, or distribution of any controlled substances. 
3-4. INTERVIEW OF: JAMES T. VALDEZ 
INTERVIEWERS: SA JOHN MESKEL 
VICTOR SAHUKLAS, US Marshal Service, SLC, UT 
OTHERS PRESENT: SA RAY CONNOLLY 
After advisement of rights, VALDEZ stated he has worked at his current job for 
about four and a half years, and he met ACOSTA on the job. They normally took 
breaks at 0900 hrs or 1400 hrs daily. When first asked about drug use or 
possession, he denied any knowledge of drug-related activities. VALDEZ was 
allowed to view a videotape showing his apparent use of cocaine. VALDEZ 
stated he snorted cocaine about five times, all within the last six months. 
When asked for specifics, he said three and then said five times. He stated 
he didn't pay for the cocaine and did not know v^ere it came from. ACOSTA and 
SHELDON were the only ones present when he used. He has never used "crack 
cocaine11 and he doesn't smoke or drink. When asked about prior use of drugs, 
he said he had smoked "dope" a long time ago. He admitted he knew there were 
laws against the use and possession of drugs, but stated he didn't know about 
any Air Force policy concerning drugs. He denied paying for the cocaine 
saying ACOSTA just provided it, and didn't know where ACOSTA got it from. 
ACOSTA would lay out the cocaine since it was his. Once when LEE, his 
supervisor, walked in on them, he thought he would quit using, but knew it 
would be hard to quit. It would take a lot of effort and devotion to quit. 
He said the last time he used cocaine was about a week and a half ago. When 
asked if he had ever us^. -.nv in his car, he motioned no with hi- head; 
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however, he eventually admitted ACOSTA had once snorted cocaine in his v^n. 
He said ACOSTA used a cassette that was in the van to put it on, and used a 
dollar bill to snort it* 
3-5. INTERVIEW OF: NEVIN J. SHELDON 
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Bldg 1917, HAFB, OT 
INTERVIEWER: SA DENNIS BEHM 
SA RON FLINDERS, Utah State Corrections/Investigations 
After rights advisement, SHELDON provided the following: During the past 
year, he used cocaine about 20 times. About six of those times were while at 
work on HAFB, UT. THe first time he used cocaine at work was about five to 
six months ago. Most of the cocaine he used was given to him by ACOSTA. When 
ACOSTA had cocaine he would usually offer to share it with the people he was 
with. In return, they would share cocaine with him when they had cocaine. 
SHELDON said occasionally other people in his section would use cocaine while 
at work. -The other people SHELDON saw use cocaine at work were LOU SAVAGE, 
BOB SWIDER, VALDEZ, ACOSTA and SUBJECT, SHELDON stated in addition to the 
cocaine ACOSTA gave him, he purchased cocaine from ACOSTA approximately four 
or five times. SHELDON didn't know vshere ACOSTA obtained the cocaine. When 
he purchased the cocaine, he would go to ACOSTA1 s house located about 7th East 
and between 3100 and 3200 South in SLC, UT. He would pay ACOSTA $100.00 for 
1/16 of an ounce of cocaine. SHELDON said he would get about 15 lines (term 
for unit dosage) for that amount. Usually when SHELDON purchased cocaine from 
ACOSTA, he would share a couple of lines with him. SHELDON said the last time 
he was at ACOSTA1 s house was about two months ago. During that visit, both he 
and ACOSTA used cocaine. SHELDON said the last time he used cocaine was on 
Friday night about two weeks ago while he and VALDEZ were at the Norwood (a 
nightclub in SLC, UT). He had some cocaine which he obtained from VALDEZ and 
shared it with him. Subsequent to this interview, SHELDON consented to a 
search of his work area and his privately owned vehicle. 
3-6. INTERVIEW OF: LEWIS SAVAGE 
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 2f Oct 89/AFOSI Det 1404 
INTERVIEWERS: SA AGUIRRE 
SA JIM JEROME 
After advising SAVAGE the interview was voluntary and could leave at any time, 
he provided the following information: SAVAGE related that on every occasion 
he used cocaine with ACOSTA or VALDEZ, VALDEZ provided the cocaine. On one 
occasion five months ago, he snorted cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg 1917• SAVAGE 
purchased the cocaine from a Roduck's (a nightclub in Ogdenf UT) patron (NFI). 
Occasionally, he would provide cocaine for ACOSTA and VALDEZ. SAVAGE recalled 
he used cocaine with VALDEZ approximately three to four months ago at a party 
in Ogden, UT. SAVAGE could not recall the name of the person who hosted the 
party. About four months ago, VALDEZ and other people (NFI) used cocaine at 
his (SAVAGE'S) residence. SAVAGE did not know who provided the cocaine during 
that occasion. SAVAGE said he only used with ACOSTAf SHELDON, and VALDEZ. 
Approximately two months ago, he used cocaine with VALDEZ and ACOSTA while at 
a party in SLC, UT. The cocaine was provide by someone (NFI) at the party. 
In Aug 89, SAVAGE purchased cocaine at Roduck's Bar and Grill, Ogden, UT. He 
used cocaine and gave some to VALDEZ and ACOSTA who also used it. On several 
other occasions, SAVAGE used cocaine with ACOSTA while at parties held in SLC, 
UT; however, he did not know who hosted the oartv or orovided the cocaine. 
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SAVAGE further related SHELDON moved into his trailer in Layton, UT, during 
Jun-Jul 89, but moved out approximately two weeks ago. SAVAGE used cocaine 
with SHELDON on two occasions during Jul 89. SAVAGE provided the cocaine on 
one occasion.
 r SAVAGE purchased approximately one gram of cocaine from a 
Roduck patron (NFI). On the second occasion, SHELDON provided the cocaine. 
SAVAGE did not know where SHELDON got the cocaine. SAVAGE related the la3t 
time he used cocaine was approximately two weeks ago. He purchased one gram 
of cocaine from an unknown Roduck1s patron and snorted the entire gram 
himself. He claimed he was depressed because his girlfriend recently moved to 
Washington State. 
He denied using cocaine or any other controlled substances with SUBJECT or 
having knowledge of any other DoD civilian employees or USAF members that were 
involved in illegal drug use. 
3-7. INTERVIEW OF: ROBERT SWIDER 
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 29 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404 
INTERVIEWER: SA BEHM 
After advising SWIDER the interview was voluntary, he provided the following 
information: SWIDER stated he had used marijuana and cocaine in the past, but 
had quit using drugs about eight months ago. He admitted using cocaine around 
Memorial Day 1989, with JIM VALDEZ (ref 8914D17-3997) and NEVIN SHELDON (ref 
8914D17-3996) in the back of Bay 5, Building 1917, HAFB, UT. This occurred 
while all three were on duty. He also provided information about a rafting 
trip he went on with SHELDON, LEWIS SAVAGE (ref 8914D17-4000) and SUBJECT 
around Memorial Day 1989. While on the trip, all four chipped in money and 
purchased one-fourth ounce of marijuana. They smoked the marijuana while on 
the trip. SWIDER thought SAVAGE had purchased the marijuana from JAMES 
FOURNIER (ref 8914D17-3934). SWIDER opined everyone who did drugs in Building 
1917 had been caught during a recent OSI operation and subsequent interviews. 
He was not aware of anyone else in Building 1917 involved in the unlawful use 
of narcotics. 
PLACE: 1986 Toyota Celica, 769-ATS, UT 
1986 Toyota Truck, 8258-CA, UT 
DATE OF SEARCH: 1 Nov 89 
SEARCH CONDUCTED BY: SA's AGUIRRE and BEHM 
A search of SUBJECT'S vehicles by AGUIRRE and BEHM did not reveal the presence 
of any controlled substances or drug paraphernalia. 
3-8. Interview of: VICKI HOBBS, SUBJECT'S girlfriend 
Date/Place: 1 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404 
Interviewers: SA Aguirre/SA Behm 
HOBBS related when she first met SUBJECT approximately eight months ago, he 
admitted to using marijuana. SUBJECT stated HOBBS he usod marijuana while 
attending high school. 
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During the weekend of 28 Oct 89, SUBJECT mentioned he smoked marijuana with 
ACOSTA, VALDEZ, and SHELDON, however did not give HOBBS any specifics. 
SUBJECT feared being involved with the authorities since ACOSTA, VALDEZ, and. 
SHELDON were arrested on 57 Oct 89. He did not mention any other drugs to 
HOBBS. 
HOBBS claimed SUBJECT was seeing a doctor for headaches. He was prescribed 
some pain medication. 
Since living with- 8UBJBCT, HOBBS denied ever seeing SUBJECT using cocaine or 
any other illegal drugs. HOBBS further claimed she owned Intermountain Auto 
and worked with Ogden Police Department. HOBBS stated it would have been to 
risky to condone any drug use by SUBJECT. She would possibly lose her 
business. 
HOBBS could not provide any further information on SUBJECT'S use or 
possession. 
CRIME SCENE SEARCHES 
3-9. On 1 Nov 89, SUBJECT executed a Consent to Search and Seize, AF Form 
1364, for the search of his personally owned vehicle and body fluids, 
specifically urine. 
URINALYSIS SEARCH 
3-10. SUBJECT provided a sample of his urine. This urine was obtained under 
controlled conditions by SAfs AGUIRRE and JIM JEROME in Building 1219, AFOSI 
Det 1404. On 2 Nov 89, SUBJECT'S urine sample was submitted to the Air Force 
Drug and Testing Laboratory (AFDTL), Brooks AFB, TX. 
SUBJECT Interview 
3-11. DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 1 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404 
INTERVIEWERS: SA AGUIRRE 
SA BEHM 
After advising SUBJECT that the interview was voluntary, he stated the 
following information: SUBJECT said he used cocaine with ACOSTA, SHELDON, and 
VALDEZ during Jun-Jul 89 at a park in Clearfield, UT, during their lunch 
break. ACOSTA passed a paper bindle which contained cocaine to VALDEZ. VALDEZ 
then laid the cocaine on the dashboard in ACOSTA1 s car. Both ACOSTA and 
VALDEZ snorted the cocaine off the dashboard. VALDEZ took the remaining 
amount of cocaine and passed it to him and SHELDON. SHELDON and SUBJECT also 
used the dashboard in ACOSTA's car to snort a line of cocaine. WAGSTAFF did 
not know where PCOSTA got the cocaine. SUBJECT denied ever using cocaine on 
any other occasion with ACOSTA, VALDEZ, or SHELDON. He had never used cocaine 
with SAVAGE. 
SUBJECT denied having knowledge of any other DoD civilians or USAF members 
that were involved in the use or distribution of cocaine. 
LABORATORY ANALYSIS 
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Urinalysis Test Results 
4-1. .On 6 Dec 89, a review of urinalysis report received from AFDTL, Brooks 
AFB, TX, revealed SUBJECTS urine sample provided on 1 Nov 89, did not 
identify the presence of any controlled substances. A copy of the urinalysis 
report is being maintained within the investigative case file. 
OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ASPECTS 
Law Enforcement Records. Review 
5-1. On 6 Nov 89, a review of Utah Bureau Criminal Infomiation (UBCI) records 
revealed the following information: 
1. Driving Under the Influence (DUI)/Drugs, 16 Jul 87, Ogden City 
Police Department, Ogden, UT, Convicted: $350.00 fine, 2 months jail 
(suspended). 
A review of Defense Criminal Investigative Index (DCII) and Interstate 
Identification Index (III) records did not reveal any further derogatory 
information on SUBJECT. 
Personnel Records Review 
5-2. On 13 Nov 89, review of SUBJECT personnel file on file at the Civilian 
Personnel Office, Records Section, HAFB, UT, revealed the following 
information: 
SUBJECT initially entered US Civil Service on 8 Feb 78 as a Sales Store 
checker. SUBJECT was assigned to the Air Force Commissary Service, HAFB, UT. 
On 16 Mar 80, he was promoted to Material expeditor, Directorate of 
Distribution. On 23 Aug 81, he was moved to the Directorate of Maintenance,. 
Pneudraulic Systems worker-helper. On 16 Sep 84, he was promoted to his 
present position of Pneudraulic Systems Mechanic. SUBJECT had no breaks in 
service since he was initially hired. 
INVESTIGATIVE/PROSECUTIVE STATUS 
6-1. Closed. On 3 Nov 89, BRUCE LUBBCK, Assistant US Attorney, SLC, UT, 
advised if the information obtained during witness interviews and SUBJECT'S 
admission was sufficient to dismiss SUBJECT, he would not pursue any further 
action throught the US District Court, SLC, UT. LUBECK reconroended SUBJECT'S 
case be taken up with the US Magistrate's Court, Ogden, UT 
On 10 Nov 89, NICK ANGELIDES, US Attorney Special Assistant, advised he would 
present SUBJECT'S case before the US Magistrate, Ogden, UT. 
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UEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FOh^E 
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suiter 60-Day Genera l Not ice - Ai r Force C i v i l i a n Drug T e s t i n g Program 
^ Al l Air Force C i v i l i a n Employees 
The 
Civilian Drue Tesning Program which is pending implementation, 
program will be implemented no sooner than 60 cays from the dat 
this notice. e or 
2. The Air Force program is aimed at identifying illegal drug users 
in order to maintain a safe and secure workplace and to more 
efficiently operate the Federal government for the benefit oi 
Americans. The determination that an employee uses illegal 
may be made on the oasis of direct observation, a criminal 
conviction, the* employee's own admission, other appropriate 
administrative determination, or by a confirmed positive ur: 
While the Air Force will assist employees with drug problems; 
muse be recognized that employees who use illegal drugs are 
orimarilv responsible for chancino their behavior. 
)f all 
drucs 
.nalvsis, 
h it 
3. The Air Force program authorizes the testing of employees for 
the illegal use of drugs under the following conditions: 
a. When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses 
illegal drugs. 
b. In an examination authorized by the Air Force regarding an 
accident or unsafe practice. 
c. As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or 
rehabilitation for illegal drug use. 
d. When an employee volunteers for testing, his or her name is 
placed in the pool for random selection. 
e« In addition, certain designated employees, who occupy or 
are selected for testing designated positions, will be subject to 
the random testing program. Employees in these special testing 
categories will receive specific written notice, at least 30 days 
before random selection, along with a detailed explanation-Q4r the 
program, as it relates to them.
 M
 1
; j * E| l-0 
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4. All specimens wix_ oe tested at an approved w^ntract facility, 
using state-of-the-art procedures. Before a positive test result 
can be verified, two separate and different test procedures are 
performed on the same specimen and both results must be positive. 
The first test procedure used is an immunoassay and the second 
confirmatory procedure is gas chromatograph-mass spectrometry 
(GC/MS). The screening levels are sufficiently conservative to 
eliminate extraneous reasons for a positive result, and with 
confirmation -by an additional and different test method, the 
chemical test results are reliable and accurate. Individual 
privacy will be allowed during the collection of the specimen; 
however, employees will be observed if there is reason to believe 
the specimen will be altered. The Air Force has developed strict 
chain of custody procedures to ensure the validity of the 
specimen tested in accordance with the Department of Health and 
Human Services Technical Guidelines. Any tested employee will be 
given an opportunity to provide evidence-to verify the legitimate 
use of prescription drugs authorized by a physician or medical 
officer to the Medical Review Officer (MRO). 
5. Strict confidentiality will be provided to the employee when 
the confirmee positive test result is verified by the MRO. 
Positive test results verified by the MRO. may only be disclosed to 
the employee, the appropriate management officials responsible for 
counseling and rehabilitation assistance, the appropriate 
management officials necessary to process an adverse action 
against the employee, a court of law, or an administrative 
tribunal in any adverse personnel action. All medical and 
rehabilitation records in a Rehabilitation Program will be deemed 
confidential "patient" records and may not be disclosed without 
the prior written consent of the employee. 
6. While the Air Force cannot tolerate the use of illegal drugs, 
we encourage any employee who has a substance abuse problem to 
seek appropriate counseling and rehabilitation assistance. 
Employees who voluntarily identify themselves as having an illegal 
drug problem wi thin' fch-e-timeframes -established by the Program, 
seek counseling, or rehabilitation, agree to a last chance 
agreement and refrain from using illegal drugs will not be subject 
to disciplinary action. However, if an employee is otherwise 
determined to use illegal drugs, he or she will be subject to 
disciplinary action, including possible removal from Federal 
service. Once this program is implemented, removal action will be 
proposed for any employee receiving a second positive test, 
refusing to obtain counseling or rehabilitation after having been 
found to use illegal drugs, or adulterating or substituting a 
specimen. 
7. The Air Force program is very ambitious and requires the 
support, understanding, and cooperation of all employees. We 
fully appreciate that this is a highly sensitive issue and want to 
assure you that the program has been designed with the utmost 
concern for maintaining"each individual's privacy and dignity. The 
0(10016 
importance of the challenge of creating a drug-free Air Force 
cannot be overstated. We ask your complete professional and 
personal dedication to achieving a drug-free workplace. For more 
detailed guidance, you are encouraged to direct any questions to 
your supervisor or the Central Civilian Personnel Office staff. 
FCR THE CHIEF OF STAFF 
r^DRA G. GRESE 
Chief, Benefits and Entitlements 
Division 
Directorate of Civilian Personnel 
) 
Cv* 
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S«ctioa A—Gf neral Information 
1. Air Fort* Policy: 
a. Commanders must maintain a constructive,, discip-
lined work environment in which both management and 
employees recognize and carry out their responsibilities,Y 
h. Necessary disciplinary action or adverse action is 
taken without regard to marital status, political affiliation 
except as required' by law, race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, or age. „ Adverse action based on an 
employee's physical or mental handicap is not taken 
when the employee can effectively perform assigned 
duties, 
c. Disciplinary action or adverse action is taken only 
when necessary and then -promptly and equitably. The 
purpose of disciplinary action is to correct and rehabili-
tate the offender, if possible. Penalties must not be 
disproportionate to offenses and are applied as con-
sistently as possible considering the particular 
circumstances of the cause(s) for disciplinary action. 
d. Disciplinary actions and adverse actions arc per-
sonal matters and are carried out in private (see para-
graph 29). 
2, Terms Explained* The following terms are included 
for general guidance. The terms overlap, and more than 
one may apply to an action. Regulatory definitions, 
where applicable, and further explanation of these terms 
are provided by the central civilian personnel office 
(CCPO) upon request. 
su Adyerse Action. A removal, suspension,, furlough 
for 30 days or less, or reduction in grade or pay. 
Actions resulting from reduction in force arc not 
included. Adverse actions may or may not be for 
disciplinary reasons (see paragraph 10). 
b. Bargaining Unit Employee. An employee included 
in an appropriate bargaining unit for which a labor 
organization has been granted exclusive recognition. 
c. Cause of Actioa. A recognizable offense against the 
employee-employer relationship such as a violation of 
rule, regulation or procedure; employment-related 
off-duty misconduct; failure to fulfill an 
employment-related agreement; or a mandatory require-
ment to take an actiqn personal to an employee. It is 
disciplinary if it results from delinquency or misconduct 
by the employee. (A disciplinary cause of action is also 
called an offense.) It is nondisciplinary if it results from 
the employee's disability, the employee's declination of 
functional transfer, or a management determination such 
as reclassification of the employee's position or termina-
tion of an extended temporary promotion- A cause of 
action cannot support a disciplinary or adverse action 
unless it is included in appropriate notices (see r below). 
d. Charge. Sometimes used to refer to the reason 
stated in notices of proposed action and of final decision 
when the reason is disciplinary. 
e. Counseling. A nondisciplinary method to provide 
information, instruction, guidance, advice, assistance, or 
encouragement It is not to be confused with the oral 
admonishment which is disciplinary. 
f. Days. Days means consecutive calendar days, 
including holidays, weekends, and other nonduty days. 
g. Disciplinary Action. An action taken by-manage-
ment to correct an employee's delinquency or 
misconduct. Included are oral admonishments, 
reprimands, suspensions, removals and, in some cases, 
reductions in grade or pay. Some disciplinary actions 
are also adverse actions. 
h. Furlough, A nondisciplinary action placing an 
employee in a temporary nonduty and nonpay status 
because of lack of work or funds or for other 
nondisciplinary reasons. A furlough is an advene action 
if it is for a period of 30 calendar days or less and is 
based on a decision of an administrative officer (see para-
graph 16). A furlough for more than 30 calendar days is 
a reduction-in-force action covered by FPM Chapter 
351 and AFR 40-351, Reduction in Force, Transfer of 
Function and Out-Placement Assistance. 
i. Grade. A level of classification under a position 
classification system. 
j . Harmful Error. An error by management in the 
application of its procedures which, if corrected or 
alleviated, might have resulted in a different conclusion. 
k. Nexus. A reasonable connection or factual rela-
tionship between the reason(s) for the action taken and 
the efficiency of the service. 
1. Nondisciplinary Adyerse Action. An adverse action 
that is taken for reason(s) other than to correct an 
employee's delinquency or misconduct. 
COL Offense. A cause of action which is due to 
delinquency or misconduct by an employee (see para-
graph c). 
n. Oral Admonishment. A disciplinary discussion 
between a management official who has authority to take 
disciplinary action and an employee subject to that 
authority in which the employee is informed that he or she 
has been disciplined by receipt of an oral admonishment It 
is a disciplinary action which is not an adverse action 
(see paragraph 13). 
o. Pay. The rate of basic pay fixed by law or admi-
nistrative action for the position held by an employee. 
p. Preponderance of the Eridence* That degree of 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind, considering 
the record as a whole, might accept as sufficient to supp-
ort a conclusion that the matter asserted is more likely 
to be true than not true. 
q. Prior Offense, A prior cause of action for which a 
disciplinary penalty has been imposed (see paragraph 
39). 
r. Reason. Includes the current cause or acuon ana 
facts, circumstances, and considerations relied on to 
support the.action (for example, prior offenses). 
a. RemoraL An involuntary separation of &n 
employee from Air Force employment. It terminates 
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explanations he or she may offer. It is . ^quired that the 
employee's answer to a proposed reprimand be considered 
according to paragraph 31. If the employee raises ques-
tions which the supervisor must resolve before making a 
decision or if the supervisor needs time to consider the 
employee's answer, additional time should be taken. In 
such cases, advise the employee that a decision on the 
matter will be made as promptly as possible and that the 
employee will be advised of the decision. 
(5) Determine what action is appropriate: 
(a) If the discussion satisfactorily resolves the 
matter, tell the employee* No further action is 
necessary. 
(b) If the discussion does not satisfactorily 
resolve the matter and the 'supervisor decides that an 
oral admonishment is adequate penalty under the 
circumstances, take the stepS" dutlinc*d in paragraphs 
13d(5)(b) through (7). 
(c) If the discussion does not satisfactorily 
resolve the matter and the supervisor decides that a 
reprimand might be warranted, tell the employee that 
the matter is not resolved and that he or she will be inf-
ormed of the final decision in the near future. 
(d) If, after discussion with the CCPO, the 
supervisor decides to reprimand the employee, prepare a 
'Notice of Reprimand* and coordinate it with the 
CCPO before delivering it to the employee. This notice 
is required See paragraphs 19e and f concerning the notice 
contents. 
(e) Note the reprimand on the AF Form 971. 
This notation is required according to paragraph a(l). 
(0 Send documentation of the action to the 
CCPO. This is required according to paragraph 22. 
15. Suspension: 
a. Purpose and Use (see paragraph 2u): 
(1) A suspension, regardless of its duration, is an 
adverse action. It is a severe disciplinary action. 
Ordinarily, it is the final step in the disciplinary process 
before removal action and is accompanied by a warning 
to the employee that a further violation of rules could 
result in removal. It is important to state such warning 
in terms of 'could' rather than 'will' result in removal. 
(2) A suspension prevents an employee from 
performing work and denies salary for the suspension 
period. Therefore, a suspension may not be imposed for 
indebtedness or for performance-related factors in 
noudisciplinary situations (see paragraph 10). 
(3) The period of a suspension is normally 
expressed in calendar days. Suspensions seldom should 
exceed 30 days unless the indefinite suspension provision 
of paragraph 16e<l) ivused. 
b. Suspensions for 14 Days or Less, An employee 
against whom a suspension for 14 days or less is 
proposed is entitled to: 
(1) An advance written notice stating the specific 
reason(s) for the proposed action (see paragraph 18). 
(2) A reasonable .-At to answer orally or in writ-
ing or both and to furnish affidavits and other documen-
tary evidence in support of the answer. The employee 
normally is given not less than 7 days to answer and 
must be given not less than 24 hours. 
(3) Representation by an attorney or other 
representative (see paragraph 29). 
(4) A written decision and the specific reason(s) for 
the decision at the earliest practicable date (see para-
graph 19). 
c. Suspensions for More Than 14 Days. Those suspen-
sions are discussed in paragraph 16. 
16. Remoyal, Suspension for More Than 14 Days, Reduc-
tion in Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or Less. 
See paragraph 17 for additional, special procedures 
when a reduction in grade is based on reclassification or 
job-grading determinations. 
a. Actions Included. These actions include but are not 
limited to: 
(1) Actions based solely on nonperformance related 
factors. 
(2) Actions that involve both performance and 
nonperformance related factors. 
(3) Actions not covered by AFR 40-452 that are 
based solely on performance -related factors. 
b. Remoral. See paragraph 2s. A disciplinary 
removal is the most severe disciplinary action. It is con-
sidered rehabilitative even though it severs the Air 
Force employee-employer relationship. Although it 
precludes improvement in the Air Force position from 
which removed, it should help the employee see the 
need for improvement in future employment Before 
removal is initiated, the facts and circumstances in the 
case must be carefully reviewed to ensure they support 
the conclusion that the employee has demonstrated 
unwillingness or refusal to conform to the rules of 
conduct or has so breached the employee -employer rela-
tionship that other rehabilitation is not appropriate and 
removal is warranted for the offense. 
(1) A removal for misconduct may be based upon 
the employee's actions on or off the job. It also may be 
based on actions before appointment which reflect upon 
the employee's suitability for federal employment. Addi-
tional information is in attachment 5. 
(2) Normally, a progression of disciplinary meas-
ures is taken in an effort to rehabilitate an employee 
before management decides to remove the individual. 
Removal for misconduct after appointment is preceded 
by such a progression unless the misconduct is so serious 
or the violation of rules and regulations so flagrant that 
discharge for m. first or second offense is clearly 
warrantexL 
c. Furlough for 30 Days or Less. See e below and 
paragraph 2h for additional information concerning 
furlough. Prior approval of HQ USAF is required 
before furlough of any duration may be effected. 
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Requests must be submitted through command channels 
to OCPO/MPKM and must include the reasor(s) 
furlough is considered necessary, efforts made to avoid 
the need for furlough, the numbers and skills of employ-
ees involved and the length of the proposed furlough. 
No announcement of proposed furlough will be made 
before approval. 
d. Action Requirements. An employee* against whom 
an action under this paragraph or paragraph 17 is 
proposed is entitled to: 
(1) At least 30 days advance written notice, except 
as provided in e below (see paragraphs 17 and 18). 
(2) A reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to 
answer orally or in writing or both and to furnish 
affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of 
the answer. 
(3) Representation by an attorney or other 
representative (see paragraph 29). 
(4) A reasonable amount of official time to review 
the material relied on to support the proposed action, to 
prepare an answer, and to secure affidavits, if the 
employee requests time and is otherwise in an active 
duty status (see paragraph 30a). However, if the 
employee is covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the provisions of that agreement must be followed. 
(5) A written decision and the specific reason(s) for 
the decision at the earliest practicable date (see para-
graph 19). 
e. Exceptions. Additional information concerning use 
of the following exceptions is in FPM Chapter 752, 
Subchapter 3: 
(1) Crime Provision. The 30 days advance written 
notice is not required when there is reasonable cause to 
believe the employee has committed a crime for which a 
sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. Management 
may require the employee to furnish any answer to the 
proposed action that the employee wishes to make and 
affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of 
the answer within such time as under the circumstances 
would be reasonable, but not less than 7 days. When the 
circumstances require immediate action, management 
may place the employee in a nonduty status with pay for 
no longer than 10 calendar days to effect the action. 
Generally, to invoke the crime provision and process a 
removal or indefinite suspension with a curtailed notice 
period, management should: 
(a) Notify the employee that he or she is being 
placed in a nonduty status with pay for no longer than 
10 calendar days. 
(b) Issue either a notice of proposed indefinite 
suspension pending disposition of the criminal action or 
of proposed removal when sufficient evidence is avail-
able to warrant removaL The notice includes 
notification of the reasonable period to answer (not less 
than 7 days). 
(c) Issue a decision on the action after the 
employee has had an opportunity to answer and 
management has considered any answer. Complete this 
action before the employee has been in a nonduty status 
for more than 10 calendar days. 
(2) Furlough Without Pay Due To Unforeseeable 
Circumstances. The advance written notice and oppo-
rtunity to answer are not necessary for furlough without 
pay due to unforeseeable circumstances, such as sudden 
breakdowns in equipment, acts of God, or sudden 
emergencies requiring immediate curtailment of 
activities. 
Section D-—Change To Lower Grade Based on 
Reclassification or Job •Grading Determinations 
17. Change To Lower Grade. This paragraph concerns 
the reduction in grade (demotion) of an employee whose 
position is downgraded because of a determination that 
the position warrants classification at a lower grade due 
to a classification error or job grading standard change 
when the position has been classified at the higher grade 
for less than 1 year. Therefore, it does not apply to an 
action which entitles an employee to grade retention 
under 5 C.F.R., Part 536 (see paragraph 3b(10)). This 
paragraph also does not apply to the demotion of an 
emp/oyee whose position is downgraded as a result of 
changes in assigned duties and responsibilities (for exam-
ple, job erosion; restructuring; or deletion of duties); 
such demotions are processed under reduction-in-force 
procedures. 
a. A determination that a position warrants 
reclassification at a lower grade due to a classification 
error or job grading standard change concerns the posi-
tion only and does not necessarily mean that the inc-
umbent also will be changed to a lower grade. When a 
position is to be downgraded in such cases, the 
employee may be entitled to placement in another posi-
tion according to AFR 40-300, Filling Positions. If the 
employee is to be demoted under the circumstances of 
this paragraph, the provisions of paragraphs 16d, 18, and 
19 also apply. 
b. Contents of Notice of Proposed Adverse Action. 
In addition to the requirements of paragraph 18, the 
notice of proposed adverse action must: 
(1) .Inform the employee why the position is being 
downgraded (for example, whether because of an 
erroneous classification or because of the application of a 
new or revised standard). 
(2) Have attached to the notice of proposed 
adverse action: 
(a) A copy of the official position description. 
(b) Either the OPM classification certificate or 
the classification decision of the Air Force which, in 
either case, must include an analysis that compares the 
grade controlling- duties and responsibilities of the posi-
tion with the applicable published classification or job 
grading standards. If it is not feasible because of the 
amount of material involved to furnish copies of the 
0 0 0 0 7 5
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have access to a negotiated grievance procedure may 
grieve those actions through that procedure. Bargaining 
unit employees without access to a negotiated grievance 
procedure and nonbargaining unit employees may grieve 
such actions through the Air Force grievance procedure 
in AFR 40-771. 
b. Remorais, Suspensions for More Than 14 Days, 
Reduction in Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or 
Less, Except for an individual covered by paragraph 4, 
an employee who is a preference eligible or is in the 
competitive service may appeal an action covered by 
this paragraph to the MSPB or grieve the action 
through the negotiated grievance procedure, where 
applicable, but not both. A nonpreference eligible in the 
excepted service may grieve through the negotiated 
grievance procedure, where applicable, or appeal 
according to AFR 40-771, but not both. 
Section F—Selection of Appropriate Disciplinary Actions 
34. Penalty Selection. The determination of which 
penalty to impose in a particular situation requires the 
application of responsible judgment to Air Force 
disciplinary policy. The disciplinary action taken is 
based on the conclusions that there is sufficient evidence 
available to support the reason(s) for action and that the 
action is warranted and reasonable • in terms of the 
circumstances which prompted it. 
*• GoTerning Criteria. In determining the appropriate 
penalty, management observes the principle of 'like 
penalties for like offenses in like circumstances/ This 
means that penalties will be applied as consistently as 
possible considering the particular circumstances of the 
cause for disciplinary action. It does not mean that 
penalties will be applied with '...mathematical rigidity or 
perfect consistency regardless of variations in 
circumstances or changes in prevailing regulations, 
standards, or mores,* (Douglas v. Veterans Administra-
tion, et al., MSPB Decision No. AT075299OO6, 10 April 
1981). The penalty selected should not be dispropo-
rtionate to the offense, should contribute to the solution 
of the problem and to the attainment of an effective 
management environment, and should take into con-
sideration ail relevant penalty selection factors. 
b. Factors In Penalty Selection. Some of the factors 
that may be relevant in selecting the appropriate penalty 
are listed below. Not all of the factors will be relevant 
in every case and others may be relevant in particular 
cases. Selection of an appropriate penaJty involves a 
responsible balancing of the relevant factors based on 
the individual'case Some of the relevant factors may 
weigh in the employee's favor while others may not or 
may even cause management to view the situation as 
more serious and deserving of a more severe penalty-
than originally thought The factors are: 
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, and 
its relation to the employee** duties, position, and 
responsibilities, including whether the offense was inten-
tional or technical or inadvertent, or was committed 
maliciously pr for gain, or was frequently repeated. 
(2) The employee's job level and type of employ-
ment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts 
with the public, and prominence of the position. 
(3)" The employee's past disciplinary record.* 
(4) The employee's past work record, including 
length of service, performance on the job, ability to get 
along with fellow workers, and dependability. 
(5) The effect of the offense upon the employee's 
ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect 
upon supervisors' confidence in the employee's ability to 
perform assigned duties. 
(6) The consistency of the penalty with those 
imposed upon other employees for the same or similar 
offenses in like or similar circumstances. 
(7) The consistency of the penalty with the Guide 
to Disciplinary Actions (attachment 3). I 
(8) The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon 
the reputation of the Air Force. 
(9) The clarity with which the employee was on 
notice of any rules that were violated in committing the 
offense, or had been warned about the conduct in ques-
tion. 
(10) The potential for the employee's rehabilitation. 
(11) The mitigating circumstances surrounding the 
offense such as unusual job tensions, personality prob-
lems, mental impairment, harassment, or bad faith, 
malice or provocation on the part of others involved in 
the matter. 
(12) The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the 
employee or others. 
c. Penalty Support. If an action is grieved or 
appeaied, management must be prepared to support the 
appropriateness of the penalty (see paragraph 12b(2)). A 
statement of management's reasoning as to the 
appropriateness of the penalty imposed must be included 
in the record described in paragraph 22. 
35. The Guide To Disciplinary Actions (Attachment 3). 
The guide helps management select appropriate penalties 
by providing a framework for interrelating all the 
relevant facts to possible courses of action and to avail-
able penalties. It is used to evaluate causes of action 
(offenses), whether or not specifically described^ so that a. 
sound, supportable penalty may be selected* Mechanical* 
use of t^he^  guide must be avoided" The guide-fa fii 
expression^of typical, causes and typical penalties only; 
therefore^causes of actioaTand penalties, in.*the^guida 
may n o t meet the demands o f all situations^It fa^tq;t>e" 
used /as^guidance. along with supervisory judgment In 
considering^the; particular: ciroin^tand376f the .matter 
and
 Tthe^appropriateness ^ of'^the 'particular faction 
contemplated. 
su Cause of Action. The 'Cause of Action' column in 
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1 
Abuse Prevention and Control Program, are 
met. Close consultation with the CCPO, social 
actions office, and the base medical services is 
J required. 
1 9a, Gambling during work -hours. 
9b. Promotion of or assisting in operation of 
organized gambling on duty or on government 
J premises. 
1 10a. Loafing or sleeping on duty. 
10b. When such action may^resuh in injury, loss 
1 of life, or damage to property. 
1 Ha. Possessing, transferring, selling, or using 
drug abuse paraphcrnailia as defined in AFR 
40-792. 
l ib . Use or possession of marijuana, a narcotic, 
or dangerous drug on government premises or 
on duty. Reporting for duty while under the 
influence of marijuana, a narcotic, or dangerous 
drug. 
l i e . Being on duty so impaired by marijuana, a 
narcotic, or dangerous drug as to be unable to 
perform duties properly or to be a hazard to self , 
or others. 1 
1 Id. Unauthorized sale or transfer of marijuana, 
a narcotic, or dangerous drug on government 
premises, or during the duty hours of any person 
involved. 
NOTE: A dangerous drug is one so defined by 
the Attorney General of the United States. 
Marijuana is any intoxicating product of the 
hemp plant, cannabis (including hashish), or any 
synthesis of them. When a narcotic, dangerous 
drug, or marijuana has been prescribed for 
medical purposes under an appropriate 
authority, its use as prescribed is not an offense 
under this regulation. The penalty selected 
should consider the offender's status as an 
experimenter, user, or addict and should, 
whenever possible, contribute to his or her 
rehabilitation and recovery. Actions involving 
those offenses' must be carefully evaluated to 
ensure that the requirements of AFR 40-792 are 
met Coordination with the CCPO, social 
actions office, base medical services, and judge 
J advocate office is required. 1 
First Offense 
Reprimand 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand 
Reprimand to 5 -Day 
Suspension 
Reprimand to 
Removal-
Reprimand to 
Removal 
[Second Offense 
Reprimand to 5 -Day 
Suspension 
5 -Day Suspension to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
14-Day Suspension 
5 -Day Suspension to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
14-Day Suspension 
5 -Day Suspension to 
Removal 
14-Day Suspension 
to Removal 
Removal 
Third Offense | 
Reprimand to 1 
Removal 
10-Day Suspension 
to Removal 
Reprimand to 1 
Removal 
10-Day Suspension 
to Removal | 
Reprimand to 1 
Removal 
14-Day Suspension 
to Removal 
Removal 
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12. Making false, malicious, or unfounded 
1 statements against other employees, supervisors, 
other officials, or subordinates with the intent to 
destroy or damage the reputation, authority or 
J official standing of those concerned. 
1 13. Soliciting contributions from other-
J government officers or employees for gifts or 
presents to those in superior official positions. 
Accepting gifts or presents offered or presented 
as contributions from persons in government 
employ receiving lower salary (see FRM 
J Chapter 735 and AFR 40-735). 
1 14. Rude, boisterous play vvhich adversely 
affects production, discipline or morale; use of 
abusive or offensive language; quarreling or 
inciting to quarrel; or interfering with the 
[ production of others. 
1 15. Theft, actual or attempted. 
NOTE: Penalty is determined considering value 
of property and relevant factors as explained in 
paragraph 34b. 
1 16. Deliberate misrepresentation; falsification, 
exaggeration or concealment of a material fact 
in connection with any official document; 
withholding of material facts in connection with 
1 matters under official investigation; refusal to 
testify or cooperate in an inquiry, investigation, 
or other official proceeding. 
NOTE: For restrictions on salary payment, see 
FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 531, Subchapter 
S2-7. 
\ * — — , , . . . 1 
17. Fighting, threatening or inflicting bodily 
harm on another, physical resistance to 
competent authority or indecent or immoral 
(conduct. 
f 18. Discourteous conduct. Includes ( 
| discourteous conduct to the public. 
1 19. Delay or failure to carryout assigned work j 
1 or instruction in a reasonable period of time. | 
1 20. Insubordinate defiance of authority, refusal j 
to comply with proper orders, wanton disregard J 
1 of directives or insolence. | 
1 21a, Loss of, damage to, unauthorized use or j 
destruction of property (including motor 
1 vehicles and aircraft), records or information, 1 
21b. When willfulness or intent is involved. 
NOTE: 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) provides that any 
officer or employee who willfully uses or 
authorizes use of government passenger motor 
vehicles or aircraft for other than official 
purposes will be suspended for not less than 1 
1 month and will be suspended for a longer period | 
[First Offense 
[Reprimand to 
Removal 
I Reprimand 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
[ 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 5 -Day | 
Suspension 
Reprimand j 
Reprimand to 1 
Removal 
Reprimand 1 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
[Second Offense 
[ 5-Day Suspension to 
Removal 
1 Reprimand to 
114 -Day Suspension 
[Reprimand to 
Removal 
[Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 1 
14-Day Suspension | 
Reprimand to 
5 -Suspension | 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
Reprimand to 5 -Day j 
Suspension 
Reprimand to 
Removal 
(Third Offenue ] 
[10 -Day Suspension 1 
to Removal 
1 Reprimand to 
J Removal 
1 Reprimand to I 
Removal 
15 -Day Suspension to 1 
Removal 
5-Day Suspension to j 
Removal 
5 -Day Suspension to | 
Removal 
Reprimand to ( 
Removal | 
Reprimand to 
Removal | 
5-Day Suspension to | 
Removal j 
Reprimand to | 
Removal 
5 -Day Suspension to 
Removal j 
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SPECIFIC DISCIPLINARY AND 
1. Substandard Performance of Duties. It is important to 
recognize the true character of a substandard 
performance problem. That requires a careful evaluation 
of the total circumstances surrounding the substandard 
work to determine whether the employee is responsible 
for the condition and can control the essentials of the 
problem. Appropriate corrective action is not 
necessarily disciplinary. A disciplinary action is 
appropriate when the cause(s) of the substandard 
performance are within the employee's control and 
when it is expected that disciplinary action can motivate 
a change in behavior to correct the substandard 
performance. .'Other situations^ may result in personnel 
actions, including adverse actions, but such actions 
should be identifiable as nondisciplinary. 
a. If the cause of the unacceptable work is personal to 
the employee but is not in the employee's control, the 
situation is not disciplinary. For example, unacceptable 
performance caused by the employee's inability to 
perform no matter how hard the employee tries requires 
nondisciplinary treatment. An action based solely on 
unacceptable performance is processed under AFR 
40-452, if applicable. 
b. If the employee has the skills, knowledge, and 
capacity to perform well, and fails to do so, the situation 
is probably one which calls for a disciplinary action to 
clearly inform the employee of management's concern 
and to motivate improvement through elimination of the 
causes of the substandard performance. Characteristic of 
these disciplinary situations are carelessness, negligence, 
refusal to perform, performance in a dilatory manner, 
loafing, or disregard for policy or procedure. An action 
which has a disciplinary component is processed under 
this document, as applicable. 
2. Medical Incapacity. An adverse action taken because 
an employee fails to meet medical standards for retention 
in the employee's position is nondisciplinary. Manage-
ment has the authority and responsibility to make sure 
that employees meet medical standards, and employees 
are obligated to cooperate. Therefore, an employee can 
be disciplined (including removal) for refusal to take a 
mandatory medical examination. 
3. Functional Transfer. While failure to accompany a 
position in a functional transfer is both personal to the 
employee and within the employee's control,. adverse 
actions in such cases are nondisciplinary. 
4. Failure To Apply For and Accept Return Assignment 
According To Orersea Employment Agreement 'Failure 
to honor an oversea employment agreement by not 
applying for and accepting rccurn assignment according 
t a the terms of the agreement is a nondisciplinary basis 
for separation. 
N O N D I S C I P L I N A J R Y SITUATIONS 
5, Preappointment Considerations. Sometimes, after an 
employee is appointed, information is developed about 
the employee's conduct or health which raises a question 
as to the desirability of the employee's retention. 
a. When such information was fully disclosed and 
reviewed by the Air Force appointing officer or by the 
OPM before the employee's appointment, disciplinary 
action is not appropriate solely on the basis of such 
previously disclosed preappointment information. 
b. If the information was not known or disclosed 
before appointment, disciplinary action may be \x ^en for 
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service* 
Generally, an employee who is serving under other than 
a temporary appointment may not be removed unless the 
preappointment consideration would have been material 
in preventing the employee's appointment (see guidance 
in FPM Supplement 731 -1). 
6, Drug or Alcohol Abuse: 
a. The Department of the Air Force Drug and 
Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control Program, AFR 
40-792, gives nondisciplinary procedures for offering 
rehabilitative assistance for drug or alcohol abuse prob-
lems. Drug or alcohol abuse involves the personal use 
of those substances. See AFR 40-792, Drug and 
Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control, for further 
explanations of the terms. Except as provided in b 
below, when the supervisor has good reason to believe 
that the cause of a job-related problem may be drug or 
alcohol abuse, the supervisor will postpone initiation of 
contemplated disciplinary or adverse action under this 
publication pending referral of the employee for 
interview according to AFR 40-792, attachment 3, para-
graph 2f(2). The contemplated disciplinary action • or 
adverse action will be postponed for a reasonable time to 
allow the employee to improve provided the employee 
reports for the interview; the supervisor knows that the 
employee is enrolled in an approved rehabilitative 
program; and the employee is progressing satisfactorily. 
(See AJFR 40-792, attachment 3, paragraph 7c for an 
explanation of 'reasonable time.*) If the employee does 
not report for the interview, the supervisor may proceed 
with the contemplated disciplinary or adverse action, as 
applicable, 
b., .Adverse action need not be postponed If placement 
of the employee in a leave "status is- not appropriate: and 
retention of the employee in a duty stata might result in 
damage? to - government property ~orrper«)naL injurycto 
the: e m p l o V e e f o r : b t h e » ^ A d v ^ ^ 
postponed* if. theTTJnmeprovdaion^ in- paragraph 
16e(l) is invoked. 
c'fjOne referral "of _the employee* for interviewc under 
AFR.40-79Vattachment .3, paragraph 2fl(2) meets*the 
Air Force obligation to advise the employee of the avai-
lability of rehabilitative assistance. Therefore,- the 
000079 -Jf? 
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employee need not be referred for inte. ,ew under AFR 
40-792 again before disciplinary or adverse action may 
b e . taken for misconduct, delinquency, or another 
job-related problem that occurs or is brought to the 
employee's attention after the date established for the 
initial interview. 
dL Participation in a rehabilitative program does not 
exempt an employee from disciplinary or adverse action 
for reason(s) that occur after the initial referral for 
interview according to AFR 40-792, attachment 3, para-
graph 2f(2), nor for reason(s) unrelated to drug or 
alcohol abuse. 
7. Motor Vehicle Operator. Disciplinary and adverse 
actions against individuals assigned to operator and inc-
idental operator positions must be according to applica-
ble laws and regulations. Thtf- following grounds are 
among those constituting sufficient cause of action 
against operators and incidental operators: 
a* The employee is convicted of operating under the 
influence of narcotics. 
b. The employee is convicted of leaving the scene of 
an accident without making himself or herself known. 
c. A federal medical officer finds the employee fails to 
meet the required physical standards. 
d. The employee's state license is revoked. 
e. The employee's state license is suspended. The 
employee may be continued in his or her position for not 
to exceed 45 days from the date of suspension of the 
state license, for operation on other than public high-
ways. This is to permit continuance of an employee in a 
position for which a currently valid state license is 
required where it is probable that the employee will 
have his or her state license restored within the 45 -day 
period. If it is apparent from the nature of the suspen-
sion that the state license is not likely to be restored 
within the 45 days, the employee should be immediately 
barred from the operation of a motor vehicle. Addi-
tional guidance is in FPM Chapter 930, Subchapter 1. 
8, Misuse of Leare. Since management has the discre-
tion to approve or deny most requests for leave, the 
general rule is that management may not take action 
based on an employee's use of approved leave, whether it 
be sick leave, annual leave, or leave without pay (see 
exceptions in b below). Use of accrued sick leave in the 
absence of fraud or subterfuge, is an entitlement of every 
employee who is ill or incapacitated by injury, and an 
approval is contingent on submission of supporting 
evidence acceptable to management The right of the 
employee to take sick leave for nonemergency examina-
tions is subject ta requesting this leave in advance, with 
the approval of the proposed time subject to the need 
for* the employee's services. When management 
approves an employee's request for leave, the approving 
official presumably makes a determination that the 
employee's presence on the job is not required. If 
management needs th nployee's services, it may deny 
leave and if the employee does not report for duty, show 
the absence in time and attendance reports as absence 
without leave (AWOL). Neither the denial of leave nor 
the time and attendance reporting entry of-AWOL is 
punitive, and neither means that the employee has 
insufficient reason for requesting leave. Rather, they 
mean that the employee's presence is required and that 
the reason for requesting leave is not one for which 
leave must be approved. The employee's failure to 
honor the leave denial and the unauthorized absence 
may form the basis for disciplinary or adverse action. 
a* If management has in the past approved an 
employee's leave but believes that the extent of the leave 
used is such that the employee is not on duty on a regu-
lar, full-time or part-time basis in a position which 
requires a regular, full -time or part -time employee, or if 
the employee has consistently failed to obtain advance 
approval for leave, management has the opportunity to 
establish an appropriate record as part of a basis for 
further action by: 
(1) Informing the employee that his or her 
attendance record is unsatisfactory and needs to be 
improved. 
(2) Warning the employee that further sick leave 
will not be approved without sufficient medical docu-
mentation and that annua] leave and leave without pay 
(LWOP) will be approved only if requested in advance 
and the employee's services are not essential during the 
period for which the leave is requested. 
NOTE: If the employee is then absent without prior 
approval or proper medical documentation, management 
may record the employee's absence as AWOL. Such 
unauthorized absence may serve as a basis for 
disciplinary or adverse action. 
b. Exception to the General Rule. Adverse action 
may be taken based on a record of excessive 
unscheduled LWOP when three criteria are met: 
(1) The record shows that the employee was absent 
for compelling reasons beyond the employee's control so 
that management approval or disapproval was 
immaterial because the employee could not be on the 
job. 
(2) The absence or absences continued beyond a 
reasonable time and the employee was warned that 
adverse action might be initiated unless the employee 
became available for duty on a regular, full-time or 
part -time basis. 
(3) Management showed that the position needed 
to be filled by an employee available for duty on a regu-
lar, full -time, or part -time basis. 
NOTE: This exception would be applicable only under 
certain unusual circumstances such as the inability of an 
employee to return to duty or to work on a regular basis 
because of the continuing effects of illness or injury (on 
or off-the-job). Other circumstances may, in rare cases, 
meet these criteria. This exception would probably not 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORcc 
HEADQUARTERS OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (AFLC) 
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH 84056-5990 
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RtPLY TO 
ATTN Or cc 20 November 1989 
SUBJECT Actions Against Civilians Involved in Drug Offenses 
TO
 Commanders, Directors, Chiefs of Staff Offices, 00-ALC; Div Chiefs, 2849 ABG; 
and Tenant Commanders 
1. I strongly endor-se the attached HQ AFLC/CV letter regarding this subject. 
2. I expect increased efforts on the part of all concerned to ensure that 
all available measures are taken to wage this war on drugs, to include 
criminal prosecution and the most severe administrative discipline which in 
most cases will lead to removal from Air Force employment. This will require 
the combined efforts of DPC, JA, AFOSI, SP, and all supervisors. 
3. Let all be on notice, that this Center and this Command will not tolerate 
the use, possession or distribution of illegal drugs by its civilian 
employees, whether on or off base. 
4. The contents of the attached letter and this reannounced policy should 
be made known to all civilian personnel so that there can be no question as 
to what can be expected by those involved in drug offenses. 
/pAMES W. '» 
> /Major GenevaJ 
/ / Commander 
USA* 1 Atch 
HQ AFLC/CV L t r , 29 Sep 89 
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ATTN Ori 
D E P A R T M E N T OF T H E AIR FORCE 
HEAOOUARTERS AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND 
A/RIGHT-PATTCRSON AIR FORCE BASE. OHIO 4 3 4 3 3 - S O O I 
2 9 SEP 1989 
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•u.jccTr Disciplinary Action For Drug Offenses 
*©» All AFLC Commanders 
1, In his re^ept pglicy statement, General Hansen reiterated that AFLC has a 
zero tolerance for drugs and employees who abuse drugs—drug abuse should not, 
can not, and will not be tolerated. With this policy in mind, commanders, 
supervisors, and staff agencies should take svift and sure action to ensure an 
appropriate level of discipline is imposed on all drug offenders. 
2, You and your supervisors have wide latitude in determining the appropriate 
action to initiate in response to drug offenses. However, recent drug 
incidents involving members of our civilian work force indicate a reluctance 
on the part of some to exercise the full range of their authority. For 
example, it may be appropriate to initiate removal action against a first time 
drug offender, even though AFR 40-750 currently suggests no more than a five 
day suspension. In this regard, it is important to note that the recommended 
range of disciplinary actions are in effect guidelines, and not a restriction 
on your authority to take appropriate disciplinary action. 
3, Disciplinary action must be consistent with rehabilitation efforts, and is 
an integral part of the rehabilitation process. The current AFR 40-750 
suggests postponement of contemplated disciplinary action may be appropriate 
in some circumstances to allow the employee to enter and progress in a 
rehabiliation program. However, this portion of the regulation appears 
inconsistent with the most recent Merit System Protection Board cases and is 
in the process of being revised. Therefore, volunteering for, entering, and 
completing a rehabilitation program does not mean a commander or supervisor 
should refrain from or postpone taking disciplinary action. Such action may 
very well complement the overall rehabilitation effort. 
4. We have the necessary tools at our disposal to carry out the AFLC policy 
in regard to drug abuse. It is up to each of us to use those too^s. 
ROBERT P. McCOY 
Lieutenant General, USAF 
Vice "Commander 
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HCAD sARTZRS AIR FORC£ LOGISTICS COMMANO 
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORC£ BASE. OHIO -43433 —SOO 
x y 
*ir\.j TO 
ATTN O^i cc 
AFLC D r u g A b u s e P o l i c y ^ 
TO. AZCLC 
AFCMC 
AFLMC 
AGMC 
ALD 
AhARC 
CASC 
ILC 
LMSC 
LOC 
OC-ALC 
OO-ALC 
SA-ALC 
SM-ALC 
USAF Med Cen 
WPCC 
( C o m m a n d e r ) 
T h e P r e s i c e r . t ' s r e c e n t a d d r e s s t o t n e n a t i o n o n t n e 
WR-ALC 
2 7 5 0 ABW 
s e r i o u s n e s s cf t h e d r u g a b u s e p r o b l e m i s a r e m i n d e r t o a i l AFLC 
m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o combat 
d r u g a b u s e . I n s u p p o r t c f t h e P r e s i d e n t , I w a n t t o r e s t a t e my 
p o l i c y a s i t r e l a t e s t o d r u g a b u s e . 
u n i m p a i r e d by i n t o x i c a n t s o r o t h e r i l l e g a l d r u g s a n d to - n o t 
t o l e r a t e d r u g a b u s e by o t h e r s . T h o s e who d o n o t a b i d e by t h i s 
p o l i c y s u b j e c t t h e m s e l v e s t o c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n a s w e l l a s 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n i n c l u d i n g j o b l o s s . 
3 . AFLC h a s an i m p o r t a n t and d e m a n d i n g m i s s i o n t h a t c a n o n l y b e 
s u c c e s s f u l l y a c c o m p l i s h e d by p e o p l e f r e e f r o m t h e e f f e c t s of d r u g 
u r g e e v e r y o n e i n AFLC t o s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t t h i s p o l i c y . 
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COMBAT STRENGTH THROUGH LOGISTICS 
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